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COMMENTS
THE STATUS OF ORGANIZATIONAL PICKETING
IN WISCONSIN
A controversial question in labor law today is whether state courts
may constitutionally enjoin peaceful "organizational picketing", i.e.
the peaceful picketing of an employer's place of business by a stranger
or minority union for the purpose of compelling the employees to
join the union." The decisions are in conflict among the different
2
jurisdictions and even within certain jurisdictions.
A basic difficulty presents itself in determining whether there is
a distinction between organizational picketing and "recongnition picketing". The latter is defifined as picketing an employer's place of business by a stranger or minority union for the purpose of inducing the
emploper to recognize the picketing union as exclusive representative
of the employer's employees for collective bargaining purposes.3 A
state prohibition of such picketing has been upheld as constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in Building Service Employees
Union v. Gazam.4 Thus, if organizational and recognition picketing
are the same, there is no problem as to the constitutionality of a state
ban on organizational picketing.
On the face of things it is difficult to see any practical difference
between the two types of picketing. In recognition picketing pressure
is put on the employer to induce him to compel his employees to join
the union. In organizational picketing pressure is put on the employees
to compel them to join the union. However, each tppe of picketing
amounts to a deliberate infliction of economic harm upon both the
employer and the employees; the picketing tends to cut off the employer from his markets, thus threatening both the employer's business and the employees' wages. Consequently, the practical effect of
organizational and recognition picketing is the same: Infliction of economic harm upon the employer, thus inducing him to interfere with
his employees' rights regarding free choice of bargaining representatives. 5 However, some courts, faced with union allegations that the
'This definition is given in Petro, Recognition and OrganizationalPicketing in
1952, 3 LAOR L. J. 819, 820 (1952). See this article and Petro, Free Speech
and OrganizationalPicketing in 1952, 4 LABOR L. J. 3 (1953), for an excellent
analysis of the constitutional problem.
"Petro, Free Speech and Organizational Picketing in 1952, 4 LABOR L. J. 3
(1953).
3 This definition is given in Petro, Recognition and OrganizationalPicketing in
1952, 3 LABOR L. J. 819, 820 (1952).
4339 U.S. 532 (1950).
5Both state and federal legislation provide for free employee choice of
bargaining representatives. See 29 U.S.C.A. §157, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATnONS ACr OF 1947 §7, (Hereafter referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act);
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purpose of the picketing was not to gain recognition, but solely to
organize the employees, have recognized the existence of "pure"
organizational picketing. 6 These decisions were handed down under
statutes which did not prohibit organizational picketing. Therefore,
in recognizing the existence of pure organizational picketing the courts
were upholding its validity. However, it is apparent that in a state
which recognizes pure organizational picketing and prohibits it, a constitutional question arises, since the Gazzam case involved recognition
picketing only.
The purpose of this article is to ascertain (1) Wisconsin's position on organizational picketing; (2) the constitutionality of its position; (3) the status of organizational and recognition picketing under
the Taft-Hartley Act; and (4) whether the W.E.R.B. has jurisdiction
over organizational and recognition picketing where interstate commerce is involved. From the preliminary remarks above we can see
that, in regard to the first two questions, the following considerations must be borne in mind: If both recognition and organizational
picketing are banned in Wisconsin and they are indistinguishable, the
Gazzam case is controlling and the prohibition is constitutional. But if
Wisconsin does not identify these two types of picketing and organizational picketing is banned, we must inquire into the constitutionality
of the prohibition. In such case, if Wisconsin has recognized the existence of pure organizational picketing, the constitutional inquiry will
follow as a matter of course. On the other hand, if Wisconsin has
not passed on the question, such inquiry will be necessary, nevertheless, since Wisconsin might conceivably recognize pure organizational
picketing in the future.
Organizational Picketing as an Unfair Labor Practice
in Wisconsin
Peaceful picketing for organizational and recognition purposes is
not expressly forbidden by the Wisconsin Statutes. At first glance,
Section 111.06(2)(e) would appear to be determinative of the question. This section makes it an unfair labor practice to engage in
picketing, boycotting or other overt concomtants of a strike unless
a majority of the employees have voted to strike. Since organizational
and recognition picketing are directed at employees none of whom
or a minority of whom are members of the picketing union, this provision apparently negates any possibility of such picketing. HowWis. STATS. (1951), sec. 111.04. Also, state and federal legislation alike make

employer interference with such right an unfair labor practice. See Taft-

Hartley Act §8 (a) (1) ; WIS. STATS. (1951), sec. 111.06(1) (a).
6 Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P. 2d 870 (1946) ; Park &
Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d
599, 165 P. 2d 891 (1946).
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ever, by court interpretation Section 111.06(2)(e) does not refer to
peaceful picketing' Thus, this provision does not mean exactly what
it says. Also, it is difficult to determine just what activities might be
considered unfair labor practices under it. In various Wisconsin
Supreme Court decisions under this section, the activities proscribed
would likewise have been prohibited under other definitions of unfair
labor practices, such as mass picketing, interference with the use of
streets, or picketing and boycotting for unlawful purposes.,
The sections of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act which do
have application are 111.06(2)(a) and (b). Section 111.06(2)(a)
makes it an unfair labor practice on the part of employees or unions to
coerce or intimidate employees in the excercise of their right to engage in or refrain from union activities. Section 111.06(2) (b) makes
it an unfair labor practice to coerce, intimidate, or induce an employer
to interfere with such right. The question is whether the terms
"coercion" and "intimidation" include peaceful picketing. If they do,
organizational picketing is prohibited by Section 111.06(2) (a) and
recognition picketing by Section 111.06(2) (b).
A Wisconsin Supreme Court decision directly in point is Retail
Clerks' Union v. W.E.R.B. 9 In that case there was picketing of a
retail store, the employees of which had declined to join the union.
The court upheld an order of the W.E.R.B. which had found the
union guilty of unfair labor practices under both Sections 111.06(2)
(a) and (b). On the question of coercion and intimidation, the court
remarked:
"It is generally held that coercion or intimidation is not necessarily limited to threats of violence to person or property. A
man may be coerced into doing or refraining from doing by
fear of the loss of his business or wages as well as by the dread
of physical violence or force."10
Therefore, the court concluded that the peaceful picketing constituted an attempt to coerce the employees into joining the union and
the employer into interfering with rights of the employees to refrain
from joining the union. Consequently, it is clear that these two types
of picketing are unfair labor practices under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.
In regard to the question of the identification of organizational
and recognition picketing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Re7Hotel & R. Employees' International Alliance v. W.E.R.B., 236 Wis. 329,
8 294 N.W. 632 (1941), aff'd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942).
Retail Clerks' Union v. W.E.R.B., 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W. 2d 698, 149 A.L.R. 452
(1942); W.E.R.B. v. International Assoc. etc., 241 Wis. 286, 6 N.W. 2d 339
(1942); Appleton Chair Corp. v. United Brotherhood, 239 Wis. 337, 1 N.W.
2d 188 (1941) ; W.E.R.B. v. Milk Etc. Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N.W. 31 (1941).
9Retail Clerks' Union v. W.E.R.B., ibid.
10 Retail Clerks' Union v. W.E.R.B., supra, note 8, at 36.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

tail Clerks' case made no positive identification of them. Rather, the
cour held that both Sectons 111.06(2) (a) and (b) were violated, so
they seem to indicate a distinction, if anything. However, neither the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Circuit Courts, nor the
W.E.R.B. have ever expressly declared the existence of pure organizational picketing. On the contrary, in every proceeding in which Section 111.06(2) (a) has been violated, the tribunal has also declared a
violation of Section 111.06(2) (b). 1 So, Wisconsin is in the position of never having positively identified organizational and recognition picketing, and never having recognized an absolute distinction
between them. Consequently, there is a possibility that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court might recognize such a distinction in the future. If
this were to happen, pure organizational picketing would then be proscribed in Wisconsin under Section 111.06(2) (a). It therefore behooves us to consider the constitutional status of such a proscription.
Constitutionality of a Prohibition of Pure Organizational
Pidketing
Whenever peaceful picketing is regulated or prohibited a constitutional question arises, because of the United States Supreme
Court's identification of peaceful picketing and free speech in the
Thornhill and Carlson case.' 2 In the latter case the court said:
"Publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way
through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of
mouth, or by banner, must now be regarded as within that
liberty of communication which is secured to every person by
1
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State."'
Of course, the right to peacefully picket is no greater than that accorded other means of speech. For example, picketing accompanied
by false statements or misrepresentation is not given constitutional
protection."4
Out of the Thornhill and Carlson cases has arisen much judicial
uncertainty and academic disputation as to whether peaceful picket15
ing is an excercise of free speech or more than free speech.' Pro-

"Retail Clerks' Union v. W.E.R.B., supra, note 8; W.E.R.B. v. Retail Clerks'
International Union, 30 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual. 2693 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Kenosha
County 1952); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. W.E.R.B.,
25 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual 2659 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milw. County 1950).
12 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106
(1940).
1aCarlson v. California, ibid., at 113.
14 Supra, note 12; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
15 GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW (rev. ed. 1949) ; Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the
Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951); Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and
Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940); Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, 56 HARV. L. Rzv. 180 (1942); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A
Dissent, 56 HAav. L. Rzv. 513 (1943); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech: A
Reply, 56 HARv. L. Rav. 532 (1943).
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fessor Cox divides peaceful picketing into "signal" picketing and
"publicity" picketing, and advocates constitutional protection for the
latter only."6 He defines signal picketing as:
"... picketing which has as its primary and often exclusive purpose the notifying of union members and members of affiliated
unions that they must not work in the picketed establishment,
or pick up or deliver goods because their unions are engaged
in bringing economic weapons to bear on the employer. Despite
its element of publicity and propaganda, therefore, such picketing may be fairly described as the signal by which the union invokes its economic power ... In such cases the picketing line
is not a method of securing publicity nor are the pickets seeking to secure adherents by persuading others of the truth of
what they say. The picket's reliance in such a case is on the
sanctions inherent in 1the discipline and organized economic
power of their union."'
Professor Cox defines publicity picketing as that which appeals only
to reason, loyalty and other emotions and which:
"... is addressed to the public, and the members
decide chiefly as individuals whether to patronize
ment or to support the picket's cause. Thus, the
the primary element and the disciplined economic
union is an insignificant factor."' 8

of the public
the establishpublicizing is
power of the

Professor Cox concedes that the same picket line will often contain
elements of both signal and publicity picketing, but he contends that
the distinction is practicable, and that an important factor in determining the constitutional status of picketing is whether the "publicity" or "signal" aspect predominates.' 9
Other writers are in favor of complete abandonment of the identification of picketing and free speech, thereby giving to the states the
right to regulate or prohibit picketing as they desire.20 A statement
by Professor Gregory can be used as illustrative of their position:
"It is hard to believe that the reactions here encountered (respect for a picket line) are all expressions of intellectual conviction as to the worth of the picketing union's several causes.
In the first place, no real attempt is made on the picketing lines
to describe what grudge the union has against the employment
or commercial policies of the picketed employer. And there is
usually no attempt to define what the picketers want, and why.
What even peaceful picketing usually boils down to is a simple
process of proscription . . . such a procedure is, indeed, a dubious venture into the world of ideas and opinions . . . Rather,
16 Cox, supra, note 15.
17 Cox, supra, note 15,

at 595 and 596.

is Cox, supra, note 15, at 595.
19 Cox, supra, note 15, at 595.
20 GREGORY, op. cit. supra, note 15; Gregory, supra, note 15; Teller, supra, note 15.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 37

it suggests a sort of psychological embargo around the picketed
premises, depending for its persuasiveness on the associations
most people have in mind when they think about picketing.
Hence, it is likely that people hesitate to cross picket lines
more because they wish to avoid trouble and to escape any
possible scorn that might be directed toward them for being
intellectually by the
anti union, than because they are persuaded
2
worth of the picketing unions cause." 1
In the same work Gregory later says of picketing:
"The fact is that it is simply a species of coercion travelling
under the guise of speech for the purpose of enjoying constitutional immunity . .. Any candid labor
22 leader would, in all
probability, confess this off the record.
Thus, these writers are of the opinion that all picketing is essentially coercive and not entitled to constitutional protection from abridgment by the states. Cogent as their position may be, however, the
United States Supreme Court maintains its pickting-free speech
24
assimilation. 23 At first glance, Empire Storage & Ice Co. v. Gibiney
would appear to be a holding that "Signal" picketing is not free speech,
but the Supreme Court, in upholding an injunction against the picketing, based its decision on the ground that the purpose of the picketing
was unlawful, i.e., that it was used to effectuate a boycott made unlawful by state statute. Thus, the Supreme Court merely held that
picketing is not entitled to more protection than other kinds of speech,
that an unlawful boycott is no more legalized because it is brought
about by "picketing-speech" than it would be if caused by the speech
or communications of businessmen.
However, though the Giboney case refuses to abandon the picketing free speech identification, its holding is extremely important in
that it advances for the first time in the United States Supreme Court
the theory that picketing may be enjoined when it is for an unlawful
labor purpose as proclaimed by a state's public policy. The state courts
had maintained this position for some time,25 and the Supreme Court
finally followed suit in the Giboney case and three subsequent cases,
Hughes v. Superior Court,28 International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Hanke,27 and the Gazzam case discussed above. In the Gibony and
Gazzam cases the public policy contravened was set up by statute; in
the Hanke and Hughes cases it was set up by judicial decision. Thus,
the holding of these cases may be epitomized as follows: peaceful
op. cit. supra, note 15, at 347 and 348.
22 GRGoRY, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 360 and 361.
23 See Petro, Effects and Purposes of Picketing, 2 LABOR L. J. 323 (1951).
24336 U.S. 490 (1949).
25 See Note, 174 A.L.R. 593 (1948), at 595, and cases cited.
26339 U.S. 460 (1950).
21 GREGoRY,

27339

U.S. 470 (1950).

COMMENTS

picketing may be prohibited when its objective is unlawful in the sense
that it violates a state public policy declared by the legislature or the
courts.
These cases are decisive in regard to a state's right to regulate
or prohibit peaceful organizational picketing. There is, of course, a
question as to how far a state may go in proscribing certain purposes
as unlawful, 2 but the Hanke case points out that a state's policy,
though not conclusive, is entitled to great weight?9 Yet the Gazzam
case presents a problem, by reason of Justice Minton's seeming approval of organizational picketing. He implies that at least he would
have decided the case differently had the state statute prohibited
organizational picketing:
"Respondents do not contend that picketing per se has been
enjoined but only that picketing which has as its purpose violation of the policy of the state. There is no contention that
picketing directed at employees for organizational purposes
would be violative
of that policy. The decree does not have
30
that effect."
Therefore, it becomes necessary to determine whether a state policy
against organizational picketing should be accorded the same weight
as one against recognition picketing. The main reason supporting a
policy against recognition picketing is that the effect of the picketing
is to cause employer interference with employee freedom of choice
of bargaining repersentatives, which freedom of choice is protected
by both state and federal legislation. 3' Such interference in induced
by the economic harm inflicted upon employer's business by the use
of picketing. Since the practical effect of organizational picketing is
to cause the same economic harm, thereby inducing the same interference, this reason is also applicable to organizational picketing.
Furthermore both recognition and organizational picketing result
in economic harm to the employees, and this harm clearly operates
against their freedom of choice of bargaining representatives. To
strengthen the argument that organizational picketing interfers unduly
with free employee choice it may be pointed out that both state and
federal labor laws have given unions comprehensively protected rights
2s Prohibitions of picketing have been considered too broad in Bakery & P.

Drivers & Helpers, I.B.T. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); and American
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Thus, a question arises as
to whether a ban on organizational picketing might be struck down under
these cases. However, attempts have been made to distinguish these cases on
the ground that they were not decided on the basis of the unlawful purpose of
the picketing. See Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REv. 180,
193 (1942) ; Note, 94 L.ed. 973, 975 (1950).
29 Supra, note 27, at 475.
30 Supra, note 4, at 539, 540.
31 See TAFr-HARTLEY Acr §7; Wis. STATS. (1951), sec. 111.04.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

in regard to solicitation of membership,3 2 which rights preclude the
necessity of the additional privilege of picketing. For example, employers may not mistreat organizers or threaten reprisal against those
who participate in organizational activities; unions are generally free to
solicite membership even on the employers' business premises, subject to qualifications as to time and place ;" where the employer owns
all convenient meeting places, as in a company owned town, he has a
duty to permit the use of such meeting places by unions desiring to
organize his employees;'4 and finally, unions naturally have the
same rights as all other solicitors, i.e., they may approach employees
in their homes, on the streets, or anywhere else. The existence of
these genuinely persuasive techniques indicates that picketing is restored to only because it goes beyond ordinary persuasion and solicitation; it exerts a pressure they lack, thereby encroaching upon the
area of free choice.
The second basis for a policy against recognition picketing is incidental to the first one. Because the employer cannot give in to the
union's demands without committing the unfair labor practice of interfering with free employee choice of bargaining representatives,-"
the harm caused to his business is unjustified. For the same reason
the harm resulting to an employer's business by reason of organizational picketing is likewise injustified.
It is therefore submitted that, since the reasons supporting a
state policy against organizational picketing are identical to those
supporting a policy against recognition picketing, the United States
Supreme Court should give the same approval to a state prohibition
of organizational picketing as was given in the Gazzam case to a state
ban on recognition picketing.
Concluding this discussion of the constitutional status of organizational picketing, this writer is of the opinion that, although such picketing should be amenable to state regulation by reason of the "unlawful purpose" doctrine advanced in the Giboney, Gazzam, Hughes, and
Hanke cases, the identification of picketing and free speech should be
abandoned by the United States Supreme Court. It is hoped that before long the court will recognize the cogency of the arguments in
favor of the abandonment, so as to obviate the necessity whenever a
state prohibits peaceful picketing of determining the sufficiency of the
policy supporting the prohibition.
12For a collection of authorities regarding the organizational rights which are
mentioned here, see 2 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (4th ed.) 3700-3840.
.s Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945).

. N.L.R.B. v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
a- See TAFT-HARTLEY AcT §8 (a) (1); WIs. STATS. (1951), sec. 111.06(1) (a).
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Status of Organizational and Recognition Picketing Under the
Taft-Hartley Act-Jurisdiction of W.ER.B. Where Interstate
Commerce Involved.
Where the employer involved in organizational or recognition
pickekting is engaged in interstate commerce or in business which
affects interstate commerce, the Taft-Hartley Act is applicable. Sections 7 and 8(b) (1) (A) of the national act are quite similar to Sections 111.04 and 111.06(2) (a) of the Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act, which sections proclaim organizational picketing an unfair labor
practice in Wisconsin. Section 7 declares the right of employees to
either participate or refuse to participate in organization and concerted
action, and Section 8(b) (1) (A) outlaws union "restraint or coercion"
of employees exercising that right. Under the Wisconsin construction
of the term "coercion" organizational picketing would be banned by
the Taft-Hartley Act. However, the National Labor Relations Board
has construed "coercion" as used in Section 8(b) (1) (A) so as not
to include peaceful picketing. The Board has held that Section 8(b) (1)
(A) is intended to outlaw only conduct involving physical violence or,
at most, direct, personal threats of economic reprisal.36 In regard to
recognition picketing, the National Act has no provision corresponding to Section 111.06(2)(b), and, except where a union has already
been certified, 37 recognition picketing is not banned. 38 Thus, neither
organizational picketing nor the type of recognition picketing with
which we have been concerned is made an unfair labor practice under
the Taft-Hartley Act.
Although the National Act does not prohibit such picketing, it
does not necessarily follow that the states may assume jurisdiction
over organizational and recognition picketing where interstate commerce is involved. An extremely important current issue is the extent
to which the Taft-Hartley Act pre-empts jurisdiction in the labor
law area. We have no United States Supreme Court decision directly
39
in point regarding organizational or recognition picketing, so it will

be necessary to examine cases which are closely analogous in determining whether the states have jurisdiction.
The general problem of state versus federal jurisdiction arises out
of several different factors, wvhich are as follows: (1) the Supremacy
Perry Norvell Company, 80 N.L.R.B. 47 (1948); In re International Typographical Union, Woodruff Randolph et al. and American Newspaper
Publishers Association, 86 N.L.R.B. 115 (1949).
37 See TAF r-HA TLEY Acr §8 (b) (4) (c).
38 See Petro, Recognition of Picketing Under the N.L.R.A., 2 LABOR L. J. 803
(1951), and cases cited therein, for development of this proposition. Contra:
N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Const. T. C., 192 F. 2d 577 (10th Cir. 1927) (case
decided under Section 8 (b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act).
39 The Gazzan case did not involve or affect interstate commerce.
36
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Clause of the United States Constitution; 4 1 (2) Section 10(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, giving the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction to prevent the unfair labor practices defined in the
act; (3) Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which guarantees to employees the right to engage in concerted activities; and (4) the doctrine of "preemption" by "occupation of the field.""41
The Supremacy Clause declares that in cases of conflict between
state and federal laws, the state law may not be applied. However,
the clause is silent where state law covers ground not covered by federal law, or where the state law is consistent with the federal law, as
in the case of organizational and recognition picketing. From this
silence it may be inferred that state law is applicable in the absence
of complicating circumstances. Since the other three factors causing
the jurisdictional problem may be considered such complicating circumstances, we proceed to dispose of them.
Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act poses no problem, since
organizational and recognition picketing are not unfair labor practices
under the act. But Section 7 calls for more consideration. Because
organizational and recognition picketing are "concerted activities," it
might be contended that prohibiting such picketing would conflict
directly with Section 7 and indirectly with the Supremacy Clause.
The answer to this argument in regard to recognition picketing is succinctly stated in Goodwins, Inc., v. Hagedorns:
cc*. the object of the picketing is to coerce the employer into
committing an act which is denounced as an employer unfair
labor practice under subdivision (a) of Section 8 of the act.
This kind of concerted activity cannot be supposed
to be en42
titled to protection under Section 7 of the act."
As to organizational picketing, while the picketing itself is not a TaftHartley unfair labor practice, the purpose of such picketing is violative of the fundamental policy of the National Act: free employee
choice of bargaining representatives. Since it would be strange indeed
if one section of a statute were to be interpreted as absolutely protecting an activity which seriously conflicts with the whole policy of
the same statute, it is submitted that organizaional picketing is not a
type of concerted activity protected by Section 7.
This position is strengthened by the Briggs-Stratton case, 43 probably the most significant United States Supreme Court decision on
the scope of Section 7. In that case the Supreme Court upheld a W.E.
R.B. cease and desist order against intermittent work stoppages. It
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 1, 2.
41See Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. RE..
211 (1950) for development of the pre-emption doctrine.
4229 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual 2047, at 2050 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals, 1951).
43International Union, UAWA (A.F.L.) v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
40
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rejected the union's claims that Section 111.06(2) (h), providing that
it is an unfair labor practice for a union to interfere with production
except by ordinary, conventional strike action, is in conflict with Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The court held that Section 7 is designed to protect only the standard types of concerted action which
4
bear no taint of illegality. '

The fourth factor causing the jurisdictional problem, the "preemption by occupation" doctrine, has been hinted at by two recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court45 and is strongly advocated by certain law review writers. 48 The argument is that, though
the Taft-Hartley Act does not forbid organizational picketing and
ordinary recognition picketing i.e., recognition picketing where no
union has been certified, the act so thoroughly regulates other kinds
of strikes and picketing, that a Congressional intent to pre-empt the
entire field is evinced.
In the Supreme Court decisions which presumably support the
pre-emption doctrine, the court in several instances declared that Congress had occupied the field of strike regulation to such an extent that
there was no room left for state action.47 Nevertheless, for two reasons neither of these cases stands for the proposition that the states
no longer may regulate organizational or recognition picketing. In the
first place, each of these cases involved a normal, peaceful strike, the
circumstances of which in no way directly or indirectly conflicted with
the policies or provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Also, the strikes
were not for unlawful or -even antisocial objectives. On the other
hand, both organizational and recognition picketing violate the basic
policy of the Taft-Hartley Act as regards free employee choice, and
recognition picketing has as its objective the inducement of the employer to commit an unfair labor practice. 4s In the.second place, the
cases are not based essentially on the pre-emption doctrine. Rather, the
court carefully noted in each case that the state statutes involved were
directly in conflict with the national act. 49 Consequently, the Supremacy
Clause alone would have been sufficient to sustain the decisions.
44
45 Ibid., 336 U.S. at 255, 256, 257.
Amalgamated Assoc. of Street Electric Railway Employees v. W.E.R.B.,
340 U.S. 383 (1950); International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft &
Agricultural Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
46 Cox and Seidman, supra, note 41; Feldblum, Some Aspects of Minority Union
Picketing in New York, 20 FoRD. L. REv. 176, 193-197 (1951).
47Amalgamated Assoc. of Street Electric Railway Employees v. W.E.R.B.,
supra, note 45 at 394; International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft &
Agricultural Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. O'Brien, supra, note 45 at 456.
48 See TAFr-HAnTLEY Acv §7 and §8 (a) (1); Wis. STATS. (1951), sec. 111.06
(1) (a).
49Amalgamated Assoc. of Street Electric Railway Employees v. W.E.R.B.,
supra, note 45 at 394, 395, 396; International Union, United Automobile,
Aircraft & Agricultural Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. O'Brien, supra
note 45 at 458, 459.
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A positive argument against the applicability of the pre-emption
doctrine is given in the Briggs-Stratton case mentioned above. The
Supreme Court, speaking of the National Labor Relations Act and the
Labor Management Relations Act, said:
"Congress has not seen fit in either of these Acts to declare
either a general policy or to state specific rules as to their effects on state regulation of various phases of labor relations
over which the several states traditionally have exercised control ... However, as to coercive tactics in labor controversies,
we have said of the National Labor Relations Act what is
equally true of the Labor Management Act of 1947, that 'Congress designedly left open an area for state control, and that
'the intention of Congress to exclude the States from exercising
their police power must be clearly manifested."5' 0
The court then held that intermittent stoppage of work by employees
was neither forbidden by the Taft-Hartley Act nor such conduct
legalized or approved thereby, and that, therefore, the state police
power was not superseded by the federal legislation over a subject
matter normally within the exclusive power of a state and reachable
by federal regulation only because of its effects on interstate commerce.
The court significantly concluded that, .. . "This conduct is governable
5
by the state or it is entirely ungoverend." 1
Another Supreme Court decision taking a position against the preemption doctrine is the Algorna Case.5 2 There the court also upheld an
order of the W.E.R.B., saying:
"In seeking to show that the Wisconsin Board had no power
to make the contested orders, petitioner points first to Section
10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act . . . It argues that
the grant to the National Labor Relations Board of 'exclusive'
power to prevent 'any unfair labor practice' thereby displaced
State power to deal with such practices, provided of course
that the practice was one affecting commerce. But this implies
two equally untenable assumptions. One requires disregard
of the parenthetical phrase '(listed in section 8)'; the other depends on attaching to the section as it stands, the clause 'and
no other agency shall have power to prevent unfair labor practices not listed in section 8."53
Applying the principles of the Briggs-Stratton and Algoma cases
to organizational and recognition picketing, it is clear that such activity falls within the area "designedly left open" to state control, and
that the "pre-emption by occupation" doctrine is inapplicable.
Having considered each of the four factors causing the state-federal jurisdictional conflict, this writer respectfully submits that, when
0
Supra, note 43 at
552 Supra, note 43 at
Algoma Plywood
53s
Ibid., 336 U.S. at

252, 253.
254. (Italics added).
& Veneer Company v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 301 (1948).
305.
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the United States Supreme Court is faced with the jurisdictional question in regard to organizational or recognition picketing, the states
should be held to have jurisdiction. This view is supported by several
recent decisions by state courts and state labor relations boards, including decisions by a Wisconsin Circuit court and the W.E.R.B. 4 These
decisions are all based on either the Briggs-Stratton case, the Algoma
case, or both of them.
SUMMARY

Having concluded our discussion of organizational and recognition
picketing, we may summarize our observations as follows:
(1) Both organizational and recognition picketing are unfair labor
practices under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.
(2) The prohibition of such picketing is constitutional. It is not
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as that amendment
gives protection against state abridgment of freedom of speech, because the picketing proscribed is for and unlawful purpose as declared
by the state legislature. The United States Supreme Court has declared that picketing is not given constitutional protection where its
objective is unlawful in that it contravenes a state public policy set
up by the legislature or the courts. Of course, it is necessary that this
state policy be important enough to warrant a restraint on freedom of
speech. The Gazzam case approved the sufficiency of a policy against
recognition picketing, and, since the reasons behind such a policy are
identical to those supporting a policy against organizational picketing,
it is clear that a state ban on organizational picketing should also be
given approval.
(3) Picketing is more than free speech, so that the United States
Supreme Court should abandon its free speech-picketing assimilation.
The states could then regulate or prohibit picketing as required in each
case without the necessity of the United States Supreme Court's sanction of the policy behind each restriction.
(4) The Taft-Hartley Act neither forbids nor approves of organizational picketing and ordinary recognition picketing ie., recognition
picketing where a union has not been certified.
.4 Hall Steel Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 30 Labor Rel. Ref.
Manual 2717 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Genesee County 1952); W.E.R.B. v. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters & Helpers, 30 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual 2642 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milw.
County 1952) ; Central Storage & Transfer Company v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs
& Helpers Local, 30 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual 2379 (Penn. Ct. of Common
Pleas, Dauphin County 1951) ; In re Waterways Engineering Corporation and
State Federation of Labor, 30 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual 1105 (W.E.R.B. 1952) ;
Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 29 Labor Rel. Ref. Manual 2047 (N.Y. Ct. of
Appeals, 1951). There is no Wisconsin Supreme Court decision on the
jurisdictional question, since the Retail Clerk? case, supra, note 8, was
litigated prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, when itnion unfair labor practices
were not prohibited by the national act.
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(5) The W.E.R.B. has jurisdiction over organizational and ordinary recognition picketing even though interstate commerce is involved or affected.
WILLIAM

A.

GIGURE

LIABILITY OF SUCCESSIVE INSURERS UNDER

WISCONSIN'S WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT
The Wisconsin Workmens Compensation Act affixes certain obligations upon the employer and its insurer because of the existence
of the employer-employee relationship.' The fundamental idea of the
statute is to award compensation when the employment causes disability, whether total or partial, permanent or temporary. 2 The Wisconsin Court has consistently held that disability under the act means
physical inability to perform the ,work in the usual and customary way,
i.e., results in a time or wage loss. Accidents which do not produce
such disability are not compensable.3 No compensation is provided
for what the courts term medical disability such as is found in the
case of occupational diseases where, having been exposed to its cause
the employee contacts the disease, yet suffers no manifestations which
impair his bodily functions so as to cause him to lose time or wages.'
The Act was framed with the idea that there would always be a
definite date, that of the accident, which would be the basis for determing the liability of the employer and its insurance carriers. 6 Since,
the employer's insurance carrier at the time of injury or accident
must pay the award against the employer, 7 the time of injury as determined by the act becomes important to successive insurers as well
as to successive employers because the disability must be sustained
at a time when the employer-employee relation exist.
I ACCIDENTAL INJURIES

In the case of accidental injuries, as opposed to occupational diseases, the time of injury or accident and its disability does not present too difficult a problem. An accidental injury is an injury that results from a definite mishap. 9 As to accidental injuries the Act, from
' South Side Roofing & Material Co. v. Industrial Comm., 252 Wis. 403, 31 N.W.

2d 577 (1948).
'North End Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439

(1935).

3

Ibid.; Chain Belt Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 116, 264 N.W. 502 (1936).

4 Odanah Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm., 235 Wis. 168, 292 N.W. 439 (1940).

5 Supra, note 2.
6Employer's Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 195 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 738
7

(1928).

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 230 Wis. 363, 284 N.W. 36 (1939).
8 Shaefer & Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 289, 265 N.W. 390 (1930).
9 Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm., 248 Wis. 12, 20 N.W. 2d 551 (1945).

